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Fragmented Copyright, Fragmented Management:
Proposals to Defrag Copyright Management
By Daniel Gervais† and Alana Maurushat‡

Abstract

´ edents
´
´
sans pr ec
dans ce domaine. Le resultat
de
´ de la legislation
´
l’´
evolution parfois mal orientee
appli´
´es
´ de gestion ont
cable et la creation
de multiples societ
mene´ a` un fractionnement du droit d’auteur et de sa
` du fracgestion. Cet article se penche sur le probleme
tionnement et propose des solutions devant permettre
´
de defragmenter
la gestion collective du droit d’auteur.
The main problem with the collective management
of copyright in Canada is fragmentation. Fragmentation
is a term we use in this paper to refer to the lack of
cohesion, standardization, and, to a certain extent, effective organization of both copyright law and collective
management per se. 1 Fragmentation occurs on many
different levels: rights stemming from the law 2
recognising several economic rights (reproduction, communication to the public, adaptation, rental, etc.); 3
within the market structure; within licensing practices;
within a repertory of works; within different markets
(language, territory); and through the interoperability of
rights clearance systems. Fragmentation impacts directly
on all affected parties whether they are rightsholders,
users of copyright works, or regulatory authorities that
oversee the process.
The structure of the paper is as follows: first, it will
explore the history of collective management societies
(sometimes referred to simply as ‘‘collectives’’); second,
focus on the origin of collective management societies
and copyright law in Canada; third, look at the development of technologies and their intersection with copyright law and its management; fourth, examine the origins of fragmentation and the various problems that
ensue from the situation; and fifth, look to potential
solutions to alleviate some of the concerns and challenges posed by fragmentation.

T

he collective management of copyright in Canada
was conceived as a solution to alleviate the problem
of inefficiency of individual rights management. Creators
could not license, collect and enforce copyright efficiently on an individual basis. Requiring users to obtain
permission from individual copyright holders for the use
of a work was equally inefficient. Collectives, therefore,
emerged to facilitate the clearance of rights between creators and users. Even with the facilitation of collectives in
the process, clearing rights remains an inherently difficult and convoluted process. This is especially so in the
age of the Internet where clearing rights for multimedia
products presents new unprecedented challenges. As a
result of an infelicitous legal evolution and the multiplication of collectives, fragmentation of copyright, and the
way in which it is used and enforced, has occurred. This
paper addresses the problems associated with fragmentation and offers solutions to ‘‘defrag’’ the collective management of copyright in Canada.
La gestion collective du droit d’auteur au Canada
´ a`l’origine une solution apport´
etait
ee a`l’inefficacit´
e de la
gestion individuelle des droits. Les cr´
eateurs n’´
etaient pas
en mesure d’octroyer des licences, de percevoir et de
mettre en œuvre leur droit d’auteur de fa con
¸
´ tout aussi inefficace d’exiger des utiliindividuelle. Il etait
sateurs d’œuvres qu’ils obtiennent des licences de chaque
´es
´ de gestion qui ont et
´e´
ayant droit individuel. Les societ
mises sur pied devaient faciliter la gestion des rapports
ˆ joue´
entre ayants droit et utilisateurs. Mais malgr´
e le role
´es
´ de gestion, l’obtention de autorisation
par ces societ
´
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´ reste
necessaires
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´ Cela est particuliere`
un processus long et alambique.
ment vrai depuis l’arriv´
ee d’Internet, qui pose des d´
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International History of
Collective Management Societies
Early history

T

he story of the rise of collective management societies has become a quaint and famous tale. It begins
with the French playwright Pierre-Augustin Caron de
Beaumarchais in the dark and dingy Parisian theatres in
the 1700s. Theatrical companies at the time were enthusiastic in their encouragement of promoting plays and
artists, but were less generous when it came time to
share in the revenues. The term ‘‘starving artist’’ was
more literal than figurative. 4
Beaumarchais was the first to express the idea of
collective rights management. In 1777, he created the
General Statutes of Drama in Paris. What began as a
meeting of 22 famous writers of the Com´
edie Francaise
¸
over some financial matters turned into a debate about
collective protection of rights. ‘‘They appointed
mandatories (agents), conducted the now famous pen
strike and laid a foundation for the French Society of
Dramas’ Authors (Soci´
et´
e des auteurs dramatiques)’’. 5 In
1838, Honor´
e de Balzac and Victor Hugo established the
Society of French Writers 6 which was mandated with
the collection of royalties from print publishers.
The net of authors’ societies, shaped by the cultural
environment of each country, slowly spread throughout
the world. The collective management of copyright was
seen as a practical and efficient way of allowing creators
to be compensated. In Italy the SIAE, under the direction
of Barduzzi, was so efficient that the state also empowered them to collect theatre and cinema taxes. 7
Problems were not limited to the domestic scene,
however. As collective management societies flourished
in their own national states, the need for cooperation
and harmonization on the international level became
apparent. In 1925, Romain Coolus organized the Committee for the Organization of Congresses of Foreign
Authors’ Societies. This Committee was founded to
tackle some insurmountable problems involving international issues. 8
Around the same time, Firmin G´
emier succeeded in
creating the Universal Theatrical Society. 9 Both of these
initiatives led to the founding congress meeting in 1926
of the International Confederation of Societies of
Authors (CISAC). 10 The founding members identified
the need to establish both uniform principles and
methods in each country for the collection of royalties
and the protection of works, and ensure that literary and
artistic property 11 were recognized and protected
throughout the world. 12

The evolving role of copyright collectives
While the formation of national and international
collective management societies may have once been
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considered revolutionary, the pivotal role that they continue to play as facilitator in the copyright industry is
more properly characterized as evolutionary. Collective
management societies facilitate the establishment of unified methods for collecting and dispersing royalties as
well as negotiating licensing arrangements for works. Yet,
licensing and royalty payment, while still important, is
not the only preoccupation of collective management
societies. Over time the role of collectives has evolved to
oversee copyright compliance, fight piracy and perform
various social and cultural functions. 13
Since the inception of collective management societies, countries have fostered the growth of such societies
through legislative initiatives in the belief that collectives
offer a viable solution to the problem of individually
licensing, collecting and enforcing copyright. In theory,
collective licensing enables creators to exercise rights in a
fair, efficient and accessible manner. It ensures copyright
protection when individual management of it becomes
difficult and often unfeasible from an economic perspective. 14 For example, tens of thousands of radio stations
worldwide cannot possibly individually clear the rights
of authors, composers, performers and producers of each
song played.
While collective management societies were initially promoted as an efficient way to collect and disburse monies to compensate rightsholders for copyright
works, increasingly the structure of collective management societies, both on a national and international
level, has raised questions about their efficiency. 15 In
addition to those significant structural issues, the market
conditions and business trends of copyright owners are
changing, and collectives must adapt. 16 Just as the role of
collective management societies is evolutionary, so is
their underlying stated efficiency. 17 While the current
milieu of collective management societies may have
served both creators and users reasonably well in the
past, the system must adapt to remain both efficient and
relevant. 18
In recent years, the advent of innovative technologies has forced collectives to grapple with new and
pressing challenges. Reconciling digital technology with
the collective management of copyright, however, has
not yet posed a problem that cannot be accommodated
within the current framework. Indeed, copyright and the
collective management of copyright has often been a
response to the introduction of new technologies
whether it is the photocopy machine 19 or the VCR or
indeed the Internet. 20 Thus, copyright law and the management of copyright are, and will likely remain, in a
state of constant evolution and flux. Like its European
and American counterpart, the Canadian experience is a
reflection of such evolution.

Proposals to Defrag Copyright Management

Collective Management Societies
in Canada
Origins of collective management
in Canada

T

he birth of copyright law in Canada was first
expressed in a Statute of the Legislature of Lower
Canada in 1832. 21 Many intermediary provisions were
culminated along the way to the official adoption of the
Copyright Act in 1921 but which did not enter into
force until 1924. 22 In theory, the Act allowed for the
existence of musical performing rights societies, however,
in practice, only one such musical performing rights
society emerged. In 1925, the Canadian Performing
Rights Society (CPRS) was formed as a subsidiary of the
British Performing Rights Society (PRS). 23 CPRS later
became known as the Composers, Authors & Publishers
Association of Canada (CAPAC). 24 Since its adoption, the
Act has been continually amended, most notably in
1931 to allow CPRS to file tariffs with the Minister, and
in 1936 to permit the control of performing rights societies, or more accurately, the performing rights society
CPRS. 25 Thus, the Copyright Appeal Board was established through the 1936 amendment.
In 1940, another musical performing rights society
was set up under the name BMI Canada 26 which later
became known as the Performing Rights Organization
of Canada (PROCAN). 27 BMI Canada was formed to
alleviate concerns that existing societies operated on a
restrictive membership basis making it difficult for other
legitimate writers or music publishers to collect music
royalties. 28 Furthermore, it was felt that both ASCAP and
CPRS had a limited repertory of music, thus failing to
address new forms of music at the time such as jazz and
country music. 29
These two organizations, CAPAC and PROCAN,
enjoyed a monopoly on both the collective management
music performance rights, but also, more broadly
speaking, they enjoyed a unique and privileged position
as the only existing types of collectives in English
Canada. It was not until 1988, that Canada would see
new collectives enter the scene. 30 And, in 1990, CAPAC
and PROCAN, with the encouragement of the Copyright Appeal Board to ‘‘harmonize and uniformize’’ their
different tariff structures and in an effort to promote
efficiency, merged to become SOCAN. 31

Calls for reform
In the 1970s there were calls for revision to the
Copyright Act. Much of the impetus of this call for
change arose from the rapid advances in technology at
the time, particularly in photocopying, audio-visual
recordings and re-broadcasting of television broadcasts. 32
The use of these technologies stimulated widespread
interest in extending the concept of performing rights
societies to areas other than musical performances.
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Prior to the 1988 amendments, the government
commissioned several reports over a span of some 17
years to address what kind of reforms were required. 33 A
consensus emerged from these that there was a need to
extend rights societies to multiple areas of copyright. (In
particular, the recommendations of the Economic
Council, 34 Keyes and Brunet Report, 35 and the Smith
Report. 36)
In response to new technologies such as the
photocopier and cable television, revisions were made to
the law adding rights and introducing new means to
promote an efficient and robust copyright regime in
Canada. Several amendments were made to the Copyright Act that impacted on collective management societies and licensing regimes. The first involved the 1988
amendments of Bill C-60 37 that modified and introduced provisions relating to collective management societies and their regulatory administration. Bill C-60 canvassed many issues such as the extension of moral rights,
the imposition of stiffer penalties for piracy, and the
establishment of copyright protection for computer programs. The 1988 amendments also resulted in the Copyright Appeal Board becoming the Copyright Board. The
‘‘new’’ Board was endowed with rate-setting authority
but with little direct authority over the organization,
membership or administration of collective management societies. 38 Bill C-60 called for the abolition of a
compulsory licence in sound recordings and introduced
a definition of ‘‘collective society’’ into the Copyright Act.
The definition, however, was limited to the ‘‘general
licensing regime’’ as outlined in section 70.1 of the Act.
Of particular relevance in these amendments was the
possibility of establishing new types of copyright collective management societies other than music performing
rights societies.
The second legislative initiative involved the creation of a retransmission right in 1990 as the result of the
Canada–U.S. Free Trade Agreement. The Free Trade
Agreement recognized the need to regulate television
and radio signals that spilled over from the United States
to Canada, and vice versa. The Free Trade Implementation Act created the right to remuneration for works
retransmitted on a distant signal by cable and air retransmission system. Canada accordingly modified the Copyright Act allowing for the establishment of retransmission tariffs which would require approval by the
Copyright Board. 39
The third reform in 1997 came through Bill C-32. 40
The definition of a ‘‘collective society’’ was extended in
the Copyright Act to capture a broader range of collective management societies. 41 Bill C-32 further modified
the mandate of the Copyright Board. The Copyright
Board was given the additional responsibilities of establishing tariffs for ‘‘neighbouring rights’’, 42 as well as for
the adoption of tariff related to private copying. 43

18

Canadian Journal of Law and Technology

Current regimes of collective management
The aforementioned series of amendments resulted
in a multi-tiered legal regime structure for the collective
management of copyright: 44
●

music performing collectives (and certain
neighbouring rights);

●

retransmission collecting bodies;

●

general licensing bodies; and

●

private copying.

The first three types of collectives are subject to
varying forms of regulation under the Copyright Act
although the statutory regime is different for each type.

Music performing collectives are regulated by
sections 67–70 of the Copyright Act. The statutory
framework for music performing collectives requires collectives to file a list of their musical works with the
Copyright Board as well as a statement of proposed tariffs they wish to impose. 45 The Copyright Board is
authorized to approve the royalties or to make alterations to the proposed rates. 46 In doing so, the Board
considers any objections to the proposed tariffs, and is
required to publish the tariffs once approved.

Retransmission collecting bodies are defined in
section 71 of the Copyright Act. The statutory regime for
retransmission collecting bodies is different from that of
music performing collectives. The Copyright Board has
the authority to approve the proposed statement of tarffs with or without alterations, to consider objections
nd to then publish the statements. 47 This regime differs,
however, from the music performing collectives in that
the Board has the specific power to prescribe, subject to
Cabinet regulations, the manner of determining the
amount of royalties. The Board has further discretionary
power to determine the apportionment of the tariff.
General licensing bodies are regulated by sections 70.1–70.6 of the Copyright Act. The general regime
operates in a sense by way of contractual default. Where
a licensing body or prospective user are unable to agree
on royalties or the terms and conditions for the use of a
work, either party may apply to the Copyright Board to
fix the royalties and related terms and conditions.

Private copying is regulated under sections 79–88
of the Copyright Act. This regime is concerned with a
remuneration scheme designed to compensate rightsholders for the use of works that would otherwise be
considered non-infringing under the Copyright Act, the
private copying of sound recordings. The Copyright
Board establishes the levies to be applied to the various
items that fall within the purview of this regime such as
blank tapes, blank CDs and CD burners. 48
The C-32 amendments have allowed for the emergence of several new collectives. 49 There are, at the time
of this writing, some 36 collectives operating in
Canada. 50 Canada has the largest number of collective
management organizations, especially in relation to the

country’s population, with the possible exception of
Brazil. 51 The number of collectives is probably too high
and it seems unlikely that all can survive in a limited
market. 52 Furthermore, the sheer number of collective
administering bodies in Canada has made it difficult (at
least for less seasoned users) to navigate through the
maze of organizations in order to use a work.
The number of collective management societies,
however, is only one factor in the problem of rights
clearance. Indeed, the question must be asked why this
problem has not been raised in the past. The answer lies
in part in the development and use of new digital technologies and the growth of multimedia products. As one
author commented:
The advantage of [collective] systems is clear. Authors and
other rightsowners could never individually control the
mass use of their works, at least not in the analogue world.
Collective management is so often the only means of
making copyright function at all. In the digital environment,
however, the co-existence of multiple societies for all different types of works could be an obstacle for an efficient
clearing of rights for what is now called, in a mysterious
word, ‘‘multimedia’’, what the Berne Convention simply
calls ‘‘collections’’. 53

The clearance of rights for multimedia products
exposes the existing fragmentation in the collective management of copyright. Not only must users ascertain
which of the different rights are in operation, but they
must then ascertain which of the 36 collectives they
must address in order to clear rights to a work.

Development of the Market
Economic rationale for collective
management

C

ollective management of copyright was promoted
as an effective way for authors and rightsholders
such as performers, publishers and producers to monitor
and, in some cases, control certain uses of their works
that would be otherwise unmanageable individually due
to the large number of users worldwide or due to the
development of new technologies. The use of music for
broadcast by radio stations is perhaps the best example
of such a use. As already mentioned, thousands of radio
stations worldwide cannot possibly clear individually the
rights for each song they play. Nor would those rightsholders want to receive, and have to respond to, those
individual requests.
Collective management has also allowed authors to
use the power of collective bargaining to obtain more for
the use of their work and negotiate on a less unbalanced
basis with large multinational user groups. 54 That being
said, most collective schemes value all works in their
repertory on the same economic footing, which may be
unfair to those who create works that may have a higher
value in the eyes of users. Additionally, collective man-
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agement ensures that users will have easy access to rights
needed to use material protected by copyright.
To a certain extent, collective management societies
facilitate the market between creators/producers of copyright works, and the users of these works. In some
respects, collective management societies can be seen as
the axel or pivot point on a balanced teeter-totter —
users on one side and creators on the other. Once an
authorized copy of a work is sold to a member of the
public, it is generally for the purchaser, not the author, to
determine what happens to it.
Collective management societies may be seen as a
balancing force between authors and users, 55 but it is
important they constantly adapt to ensure they are best
able to facilitate this process. Their continued justification, in some respects, relies on their ability to act as
effective facilitators. Where collective management societies are unable to effectively play this role, and where
they may actually impede or hamper the system by
unreasonably preventing the use of works, a re-evaluation of both their role and value becomes necessary.
56 demands that this issue be brought
´
Indeed, Theberge
to the forefront.

Rationale for collectives in the digital
environment
Collectives are now facing the challenges of the digital age. Claims that copyright does not work in the
digital age are usually the result of the inability of users
to use protected material lawfully. 57 Especially with the
Internet, users of copyright material can (and want to)
easily access millions of works and parts of works,
including government documents, legal, scientific, medical and other professional journals, music, video
excerpts, e-books, etc. While digital access is fairly easy
once a work has been located (though it may require
identifying oneself and/or paying for a subscription or
other fee), obtaining the right to use the material beyond
its primary use (which is usually only listening, viewing
or reading) is more difficult unless already allowed under
the terms of the licence or subscription agreement or as
an exception to exclusive rights contained in a nation’s
copyright regime. 58
While in some cases, this is the result of the rightsholders’ unwillingness to authorize the use — and generally a legitimate application of their exclusive rights —
there are several other cases where it is simply the
unavailability of simple, user-friendly licensing that
makes authorized use impossible. Both rightsholders and
users are losers in this scenario: rightsholders because
they cannot provide authorized (controlled) access to
their works and lose the benefits or orderly distribution
of their works, and users because there is no easy authorized access to the right to reuse digital material. In other
words, this inability to ‘‘control’’ their works means that
these works are simply unavailable (legally) on the
Internet. 59
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The pervasive nature of the Internet and the
increasing tendency to link various appliances and
devices such as personal digital assistants (PDAs) and,
soon, television sets and stereo receivers, to the global
network means keeping any material that can be digitized off the Internet will become increasingly difficult
— technically, commercially, or both. While a combination of technology and law might allow rightsholders to
keep material off major servers in a number of countries
(though not all countries have copyright laws) and/or
request that Internet service and access providers
(ISPs/IAPs) block access to (domestic and foreign) Web
sites that make possible access to ‘‘pirated’’ material,
user/consumer demand for digital access may ultimately
prevail. Consequently, only rightsholders who are prepared to meet this demand will survive. 60
The fact remains that a large amount of copyright
material is (and more will be) available through digital
networks and that the ‘‘market’’ will need to be organized in some way. By ‘‘organized’’, we mean that users
will want access and the ability to reuse material lawfully; and rightsholders will be able to meet those needs
in a reasonably efficient way. 61 These uses include putting the material on a commercial or educational Web
site or an Intranet, e-mailing it to a group of people,
reusing all or part of it to create new copyright material,
storing it and perhaps distributing on a CD-ROM.
Authors and other rightsholders will want to ensure that
they can put reasonable limits on those uses and reuses
and get paid for commercially significant uses of their
material (absent, of course, a specific exemption in the
Act).
It has been argued 62 that collective management
offers the most workable solutions and best represents
key principles of intellectual property amid rapid technological advances. Collective management societies may
be instrumental in facilitating relations between copyright holders and users of content providing they remain
efficient. Their expertise and knowledge of copyright law
and management may be essential to make copyright
work in the digital age. Under this theory, the individual
exercise of rights in the digital environment is rendered
impractical if not futile due to the possibility and ease of
disseminating works. Collectives, therefore, may become
critical intermediaries in this process providing they are
able to adapt to both the needs and concerns of the
creators they represent and to the market. Their expertise and knowledge of copyright law and management
may be viewed as essential to make copyright work in
the digital age. 63
On the other hand, it may be that, with the aid of
technology, the individual exercise of rights will become
not only feasible but a more efficient solution, at least in
certain cases. 64 Thus, it may be the case that the advancement of new technologies will minimize the role of
collective management societies. Whatever view is taken,
the rationalization of the collective management of copy-
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right remains an important task; it may be that collective
management societies need to re-conceptualize their role
as less aligned with ‘‘collective’’ administration and more
aligned with the ‘‘central’’ administration of facilitating
rights management.
If collective management societies are to play the
role of intermediary fully and efficiently, these organizations must acquire the rights they need to license digital
uses of protected material and build (or improve current)
information systems to deal with ever more complex
rights management and licensing tasks. Thus, the ability
of collectives to meet the needs of both authors and
users is dependent on the evolution of both their
internal practices, and the framework in which collective
management societies work to alleviate the many concerns of fragmentation within the current system. 65
The problem of rights clearance and the collective
management of copyright in the digital era is not unique
to Canada. All nations and collective management societies throughout the world are having to adapt their laws
and infrastructure to meet the challenges of digital technology and multimedia products. This challenge arises
irrespective of the philosophical underpinnings of a
nation’s copyright system, whether it is rooted in economic rights, moral rights, utilitarian rights or any combination of these. 66
The advent of digital technologies is not to be mistaken for the one and only, or main problem, of the
collective management of copyright. As we have already
seen, the sheer number of collectives in Canada contributes greatly to problems of efficient rights clearing.
Meanwhile, identification of the various rights involved
coupled with finding the rightsholders associated with
the underlying rights is perhaps aptly entitled ‘‘organized
chaos’’. 67 The examination of digital technology and the
rights clearance of multimedia products merely highlights problems that already exist in the current system. 68
An examination of the use of multimedia products and
their intersection with collectives allows us to take a
closer look at some of the problems of the collective
management of copyright. In this respect, it is like putting the cell of a diseased specimen under the lens of a
microscope — while it does not illustrate the entire
problem, it allows us to analyze some of the symptoms.

Fragmentation: The Problem
Unveiled
The fragmentation of rights

C

opyright, as such, does not exist. In effect, national
laws on copyright do not, or no longer, create a
‘‘copy’’-right. Rather, they outline a collection of rights in
relation to literary and artistic works which reflect a
series of acts requiring authorization from the rightsholder. Canadian copyright law is not an exception to
this rule regardless of whether section 3 of the Act iter-
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ates a notion of ‘‘copy’’-right; it is merely illusory. This
complicates decisions about how to adapt the copyright
framework to merging technologies.
The history of copyright law is a progression along
two axes; first, along a ‘‘work’’ axis, to bring under the
copyright umbrella new forms of creation (photography,
cinematography, computer programs); second, along a
‘‘rights’’ axis, to create rights in respect of new uses of
copyright material (radio and television broadcasting,
cable and satellite transmission, now the Internet). 69 Initially, each type of use fit rather nicely under one right
(or fragment of the copyright ‘‘bundle’’): 70 reproduction
was the right for books, 71 records and compact discs;
communication to the public for broadcasters, 72 adaptation for novels made into movies, etc. But the Internet
changed all that: making a protected work available on
an Internet server is a reproduction (on the server) and a
communication to the public. 73 Holders of the reproduction fragment of the copyright bundle in respect of
musical works are asking for a tariff to be paid because
broadcasters are making copies that go beyond the
ephemeral recording exception. 74 Exceptions to rights
are being challenged. 75 Not only can the right be
exploited differently, and different fragments grouped
(‘‘sub-bundles’’), as in the broadcasting and Internet
examples above, but each of these ‘‘rights’’ may be further subdivided based on the language and the market
where the work will be used. The Act itself recognizes
this subdivision as articulated in section 13(4):
The owner of the copyright in any work may assign the
right, either wholly or partially, and either generally or subject to limitations relating to territory, medium or sector of
the market or other limitations relating to the scope of the
assignment, and either for the whole term of the copyright
or for any other part thereof, . . .

Clearly, the rights contained in section 3 are no
longer useful in mapping out the real world. 76 Copyright
fragments have lost their meaning to users and rightsholders alike. In actuality, contracts and licensing
arrangements for copyright works do not usually refer to
the specific rights enumerated in this section or if they
do, it is an afterthought. 77 Contracts define the ‘‘use’’ that
should be allowed, and not which fragments of rights are
needed. This is not borne from any malicious intent but
stems from how the rights within a particular market
develop over time, factoring into the equation the evolution of technology. In the era of the Internet, the use of a
work (often multimedia) operates in some respects as a
fiction vis-`
a-vis the Act. 78 The multimedia work is subdivided into the various components such as a sound, an
image, a photograph, or a software program where rights
clearance is required for each consequent subcomponent. These works are broken down into specific
rights as defined within the legislation and are often
analogized to other categories within the Act. A multimedia work, for example, under Canadian law is a
‘‘compilation’’ while a software program is a ‘‘literary
work’’.

Proposals to Defrag Copyright Management

The fragmentation of clearance processes
The changes previously outlined pose significant
problems for rights clearance because, as the division of
tasks among the fragments is becoming progressively
obsolete (at least for newer uses), collective administration is still organized around such fragments. SOCAN
has the right of communication to the public, while
SODRAC, CMRRA, CANCOPY and COPIBEC have the
rights of reproduction (for musical and textual works,
respectively). Hence, even when efficient systems are
available, rights clearance may prove a difficult task.
The inherent difficulty in rights clearance is perhaps
best illustrated by way of an example, showing that the
process often involves multiple layers of rights, and
clearing each of these rights can be a labyrinthine process (even if each such process is in itself efficient). This
may be analogized to a maze whose point of entry and
exit are challenging to find, and where the path to completion remains filled with obstacles and hurdles. Now
imagine not one maze but three additional mazes
stacked on top: the copyright works (or substantial parts
of works) used the subdivision of rights within such
work, the various rightsholders associated with each of
those rights, and the particulars of each market/territory
where the rights must be cleared. Because rights ownership and licensing arrangements change through time,
our maze becomes more like a four-dimensional matrix.
Take for example the making of a film. The foundation dimension of the matrix would consist in identifying and clearing the rights for the various types of
works within the film. We will call this the ‘‘big bundle’’
of rights. The works in question could include the
screenplay, the book which the screenplay was based on,
the musical works incorporated in the film, any art or
photographs used in the setting, as well as the end
product of the film itself. Each of the works in this ‘‘big
bundle’’ may in turn involve several different rights,
rightsholders, and systems of rights clearance which
comprise the remaining three layers in our four-dimensional matrix.
Let us now turn our attention to making our film
which we will call, ‘‘The Big Bundle’’, based on the book
titled, ‘‘Bundling’’. To use this book, we will require
authorization from both the author and the publisher.
Once we have acquired the rights to the book ‘‘Bundling’’, we turn our attention to making a screenplay
based on the book. We hire an American screenwriter to
create the script for ‘‘The Big Bundle’’. Afterwards, we
may have to comply with the rules and regulations of the
Screenwriters’ Guild. 79
We must now consider the musical works that we
will use in our film. Several musical works have been
selected to accompany scenes throughout our movie. We
must obtain authorization for each musical work. Some
of the songs have been written and performed by the
same composer while others have separate composers,
lyricists and performers. Each musical work will inevi-
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tably have a producer to contend with as well. One of
these rightsholders has died and the rights to the musical
work are now in the deceased’s estate — this particular
rightsholder has four heirs. For our opening theme song,
we have decided to commission an original musical
work which will involve a composer, performers and a
producer. The use of these musical works in our film will
in turn lead to the soundtrack for ‘‘The Big Bundle’’.
As we shoot our film, various set designs are built.
We may wish to display artwork or photographs to set
the ambiance for a scene in which case the artists and/or
art owners will need to be contacted. One scene will be
shot in a park with a statue. Permission to film the statue
within the scene must be obtained. Or perhaps we will
have a scene where our characters rent a movie, and we
wish to show two minutes of footage from this film,
leading to yet another rights clearance transaction.
While in search for the perfect location for specific
scenes, we have decided to shoot ‘‘The Big Bundle’’ in
Canada and France. Different issues and rights will need
to be cleared according to the laws and contractual
agreements negotiated in each of these nations. In addition to the number of varying rights and rightsholders in
each of these nations, each nation will also have its own
unique system of rights clearance which may or may not
involve anywhere from one collective society and
upwards to an almost unlimited amount.
As our film is being made, new rights and rightsholders emerge. For example, under French law, our
director has an unwaivable and non-transferrable right
to remuneration for several forms of exploitation of the
film in France, including video rentals. 80 Meanwhile, we
may have to contend with guilds when dealing with any
potential rights that our actors and writers may acquire
in our production, and, if we choose to involve actors
from the countries that we are shooting in, perhaps different national guilds or collectives. Likewise we, the
studio/producer, will acquire rights in our film, either as
full copyright or, as in Europe, a neighbouring right as
producers of the ‘‘first fixation’’ of the audiovisual
work. 81
Once our film is made, we will have to resolve
issues of distribution. Different cinema companies will
have to be negotiated with for the right to distribute and
play ‘‘The Big Bundle’’. Our film will eventually be
released on video and possibly later broadcast over television, and perhaps cable and satellite. The situation is
further complicated by the fact that separate distribution
agreements will need to be negotiated on a per country
basis. And, as indicated above, each element of this
puzzle, including copyright transfers, may change
through time.
The four-dimensional rights matrix is complex,
posing several challenges in the production of our film.
Each work we wish to use is exploited in a unique way,
thus different types of works are often subject to a separate legal and administrative regime. In most circum-
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stances, rights clearance will have to be negotiated with
the applicable collective society; finding which collective
society has acquired the right to administer and negotiate on behalf of the rightsholder is another matter altogether. One collective society may represent a creator for
part of her repertoire, and another collective for the
remainder. 82 Likewise, each different type of work,
whether it is rights to a sound recording or the rights to a
screenplay, will inevitably involve multiple collective
management societies, multiple rightsholders, and
numerous rights stemming from the works of these
rightsholders. Again, all of this varies over time as legislation, practices and the factual situations presented in this
example constantly change. The fragmentation within
the system is complex: different works are exploited in a
variety of ways while each of these works involves multiple rights, rightsholders, systems of rights clearance, and
markets. Fragmentation is all-pervasive. The hurdles in
weaving our way through this rights clearance matrix are
perplexing at best, insurmountable at worst.
How does one simplify the system? Is it possible to
shrink the four-dimensional matrix into a single-layered
maze? What tools may be developed to aid in hurdling
obstacles along the way? Should a centralized ‘‘information booth’’ be set up at the entranceway to guide users
through the maze? Will some form of standardization be
sufficient or is a new approach to copyright altogether
required?

Defragging the System

V

arious clearance systems are based on sometimes
obsolete fragments, each with its own idiosyncrasies. This means that even if each such ‘‘sub-system’’ (for
a clearance process requiring several clearance transactions performed through different intermediaries,
including several collectives) is efficient, efficiency of the
process as a whole is in jeopardy. When applied to the
Internet, the very mechanisms in place for rights clearance become part of the equation when building an
efficient business model. In other words, collective management is not a neutral service. Given the fragility of
Internet-based business models for delivery of copyright
content on the Internet, 83 it is worth asking whether
such influence is positive, especially in light of the fact
that it follows from the application of legacy systems and
regulations that were never intended for a network technology such as the Internet. Economically efficient clearance ‘‘should ensure that copyright administration
favours no one delivery method over another’’. 84
Many collective management organizations may be
critical intermediaries in the process of organizing new
markets and in making improvements to the existing
system. Their expertise and knowledge of copyright law
and management may be essential to make copyright
work in the digital age. 85 Regardless of whether digital
technology is involved, the standardization of practices
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amongst collective management societies would lead to
greater efficiencies and alleviate some of the fragmentation under the current system. To play that role fully and
efficiently, however, these organizations must acquire the
rights they need to license digital uses of protected material and build (or improve current) information systems
to deal with ever more complex rights management and
licensing tasks. Additionally, collective management societies will need to organize and cooperate fully, both on a
national and international scale to achieve their role as
facilitators of rights clearance. The following suggestions
are offered as potential means to achieve this goal.

Technology
Technology and, in particular, electronic rights
management systems, 86 are a useful tool in copyright
clearance, especially in the digital environment. To
borrow from our four-dimensional matrix, such technologies would operate like a joystick to a videogame. The
joystick is a mechanism of control — it facilitates rights
clearance in that it aids the user in jumping over hurdles
steering them towards proper identification of the rightsholders involved and the rights that will need to be
cleared. While it does not guarantee the success of the
player, the joystick greatly increases the likelihood of
successfully navigating through the matrix.
Before we can understand electronic copyright
management systems, we need to understand the concepts that underlie such systems from a more technical
perspective, starting with ‘‘rights management’’ itself.
Copyright management systems (CMS) are basically
databases that contain information about content
(works, discrete manifestations of works and related
products) and, in most cases, the author and other rightsholders. 87 That information is needed to support the
process of authorizing the use of those works by others.
A CMS thus usually involves two basic modules, one for
the identification of content and rightsholders, the other
for licensing (or, rarely, for other rights transactions, such
as a full assignment). In many cases, ancillary modules
such as payment or accounts receivable are also considered part of the system, but the core of a CMS is content
and rights identification coupled with a licensing tool.
A copyright management system can be used by
individual rightsholders or by third parties who manage
rights on behalf of others. A rightsholder might use the
system to track a repertory of works or products embodying such works (or substantial parts thereof), or an
organization representing a group of rightsholders might
use a CMS to track each rightsholder’s rights and works.
Such an organization might be a literary agent representing a number of writers, or, more commonly, a collective management society.
Applying the above concepts, it is easy to see that
rights management functions are made much easier
with computers, which can act both as huge rights
databases and automated licensing engines. Computer-
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ized systems allow rightsholders to automatically grant
licences to users without human intervention, which has
the benefit of keeping transaction costs low and making
licensing an efficient, Internet-speed process: licences to
use a specific work can be granted online, 24 hours a
day, to individual users. Ideally, such licences will be
tailored to a user’s needs. 88 For example, a corporation
may want to post a flattering newspaper article on its
Web site or send it via email to its customer base; an
individual author may decide to purchase the right to
use an image, video clip, or song to use in her/his own
creative process; a publishing house might purchase the
right to reuse previously published material. Electronic
Copyright Management Systems (ECMS) may also be
used to deliver content in cases where the user does not
have access to such content in the required format. Or,
they may be used to create licensing sites or offer
licensing options at the point where the content is made
available. Finally, digital technology can also be used to
track usage (‘‘metering’’ and ‘‘monitoring’’), look for
unauthorized online uses (programs known as ‘‘spiders’’
or ‘‘bots’’ that scour the Web looking for unauthorized
copies of material on Web sites) or to encrypt material in
digital containers to limit further uses of the material.
For transactional (case-by-case) licences, an ECMS
thus basically acts as a licensing engine. There are various
implementations of such systems that range in technical
sophistication from the very basic to the very complex
(and expensive). Using an ECMS, the user can search
available content and rights online, submit a licence
request online and receive a response from the system. A
variation on this theme is where the user first locates the
content (using a search engine or portal) and is then
offered licensing options at the point of content. 89

To protect content on the Internet, a number of
‘‘rights management systems’’ are now combined with
technology that prevents reuse of online content (except
as authorized at the time the content was acquired). 90
This may take the form of a ‘‘container’’ in which digital
content is delivered and/or a watermark to track content
posted on (publicly-available) Web sites. The protection
technology checks for authorization before providing
access to the protected content or allowing the user to
make or send a copy. 91 Whether these systems succeed
as intermediaries will ultimately depend on users’ reaction and acceptance level. The negative reaction to the
industry’s offering of such services in the post-Napster
era shows that users will not easily accept stringent controls. 92

In order to be optimally efficient and deal with
digital usage information, online member and work
registration, user requests and online transactional
licensing (where such licensing on reasonably standard
terms is possible), collective management societies need
a rights management system with both an efficient
‘‘back-end’’ system and a user-friendly online interface
(‘‘front-end’’). However, building an all-encompassing

online multimedia licensing system operated jointly by
all Canadian collectives does not currently seem justified
either by current licensing practices or by prevailing
market conditions. To go back to our matrix, ECMS are
akin to both a tool to aid in hurdling obstacles and, at
the same time, act as an information booth, identifying
rights and then directing users to rightsholders. 93
The sheer number of collectives in Canada, which
surpasses the number of similar organizations in almost
any other country (even those with far higher population
levels), 94 potentially poses a problem for establishing
ECMS. It is not economically feasible to build an integrated rights management system for each of them.
Clearly, some collectives have rights management needs
that can be met with a very basic infrastructure. As a rule,
however, to offer online services and deal with online
users and usage, including rights management information, an efficient system is required. That does not mean
that to perform other functions, the fractioning of the
‘‘CMO market’’ in Canada is necessarily counter-productive. In order to implement an efficient system, collectives should cooperate within appropriate groupings (i.e.,
CMO’s having a sufficient degree of commonality) to
limit the number of rights management systems to be
developed and they should develop compatible systems
to ensure that the exchange of data will be possible. 95
To be able to licence quickly and efficiently online,
an ECMS is indispensable. But, under the current structure of collective rights management in Canada, an
ECMS does not in and by itself solve the problem of
fragmentation; it only assures that the fragment covered
by the ECMS in question is managed efficiently.

Extended collective licensing
The extended collective licence is used in all Nordic
countries. It is a voluntary assignment or transfer of
rights from rightsholders to the collective with a legal
extension of the repertoire to encompass the nonmember rightsholders, thus simplifying and making
more effective the acquisition of rights. Some call it a
‘‘backup legal licence’’, but this expression may be confusing since the rightsholder can choose to opt out of the
system. This, of course, is not possible under a compulsory (also known as legal) licence. 96
Extended collective licensing may be an appropriate
and effective method in facilitating rights clearance.
Extended collective licensing could be considered in the
next phase of reform of the Copyright Act, but only for
‘‘general regime’’ collectives and only in respect to published works, thus excluding rights such as music performance, which have a special regime under the Act. 97
The extended collective licence works as follows: as
soon as a considerable (or substantial) number of rightsholders in a given category agree to join forces in a
collective, the repertoire of the appropriate collective is
automatically extended, not only to other domestic
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rightsholders in the same category but also to all relevant
foreign rightsholders. The licence also extends to
deceased rightsholders, particularly in cases where estates
have yet to be properly organized.
The extended collective licence is an interesting
model for countries like Canada where, on the one
hand, rightsholders are reasonably well organized and
informed, and, on the other hand, a great part of the
material that is the object of licences comes from foreign
countries. It is often more difficult and time-consuming
to obtain an authorization for the use of foreign material.
The extended collective licence provides a legal solution
to this situation, as the agreements struck between users
and rightsholders will include all non-excluded domestic
and foreign rightsholders.
Finally, by accelerating the acquisition of rights, the
extended collective licence also increases the efficiency
and promptness of royalties’ collection. The monies
redistributed to rightsholders are thereby increased.
An extended collective licence is, however, of limited application. Such licences alleviate the specific fragmentation problem of acquiring authorized access to
works of non-members of a collective but they do not
address the seemingly larger problems associated with
fragmentation. Furthermore, such a collective licensing
regime is limited to collectives operating under the ‘‘general regime’’. To draw upon our matrix image, an
extended collective licence effectively removes some of
the obstacles in rights clearance but it is a specific solution aimed at a specific problem.

Combined multiple licences assessed by
component uses
A multiple blanket licence would present an alternative solution. The two most relevant uses of such
licences are where there are inherent difficulties in
advanced clearance of rights, and where consolidation is
more practical from a user’s (and sometimes creator’s)
perspective. From a functional point of view, collective
management societies were seen as a practical substitute
for a blanket licence due to the multitude of uses and
the difficulty of advance clearance. 98 Forcing users to go
through a collective society to obtain authorization for
the use of a work as opposed to dealing with rightsholders on an individual level was seen as a necessary
process. It may be the case, however, that with multimedia works, a blanket licence may be a more appropriate response.
While collective management societies lessen the
difficulties of advanced clearance, the issue of advanced
clearance for multiple rights or media forms requires
additional solutions. Clearing countless rights for multimedia products is a cumbersome procedure. Some
multimedia producers have stated that they would
rather use works in the public domain or hire persons to

Canadian Journal of Law and Technology

create new works rather than obtaining permission to
use existing copyright works. 99 A new blanket licence
could operate on the level of ‘‘uses’’. In other words, fees
for the use of a work would be determined based on the
actual use of a work, and not based on the negotiated
term set by each collective society.
This solution has the advantage of being fairer to
users and potentially achieves administrative efficiencies
for both creators and users. Such a system would be
fairer to users in that there would no longer be a discrepancy in fees to be paid for similar uses of a work. 100
Administrative efficiencies, on the other hand, result
from each and every collective having to file tariffs to be
approved by the Copyright Board. 101 This would require
changes to the current law but would allow for more
efficient uses of the Board’s resources, and would be a
significant tool to users in clearing rights
In essence, a single tariff (and cheque) could be
established for different types or uses of works. This
would require a more proactive approach on the part of
the Copyright Board, but it is not unprecedented. 102 In
this sense, the user would pay an admission fee at the
entrance to the matrix and those at the ticket booth
would identify rightsholders and disperse cheques to the
varying collective management societies. This would not
require the law to be changed but could require a centralized administrative regime to disperse the cheques.
Though a centralized administrative agency may be the
key to the success of such a system, it should be noted
that it would not necessarily be required. The money
could simply be put in one pot, and in order to draw
money from the pot, collective management societies
would have to cooperate in order to ascertain who
would get what. The Copyright Board could simply elect
not to approve tariffs filed by collective management
societies, requiring them to modify the fees to a set standard.
This solution is somewhat coercive; it would force
collective management societies to cooperate with one
another in order to receive monies. But such ‘‘umbrella’’
collectives already exist to receive monies from users that
are then redistributed to the member collectives, who in
turn distribute to their members. The best examples are
the Private Copying Collective of Canada (CPCC) and
the Neighbouring Rights Collective of Canada
(NRCC). 103
While this solution would appear to have many
benefits, the downside is that not all collectives may be
willing to cooperate voluntarily with one another. It may
turn out that more inefficiencies and battles over money
are created. Such an outcome would not address the
difficulties for users to obtain advance clearing of rights
nor would such a solution necessarily rid the system of
discriminatory practice. 104
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Exemptions of Acts and compulsory
licensing

of information. It is sometimes referred to as a ‘‘one-stopshop’’ service (or ‘‘guichet unique’’).

This solution allows us to draw a crucial distinction
between two legislative tools at Parliament’s disposal.
First, the government may take away the rights of
authors entirely, by exempting certain acts that would
otherwise require an authorization from the author. Perhaps the best example is the inclusion of those acts into
the fair dealing sphere although there are other types of
exemptions in the Act. 105 In other cases, the government
may decide that it would be impractical or unfair to
require that an authorization be obtained and impose a
compulsory licence: a work covered by a compulsory
licence may be used without authorization, provided the
tariff (if any) set by the Copyright Board is paid.

The centralized licensing agency acts as an information booth or a service counter. Users can then obtain all
needed licences at the same time and place. The advantage of this system is that users are saved from the
onerous task of identifying rightsholders and then
clearing rights involved through multiple agents. Ideally,
a centralized licensing agency would utilize an electronic
rights management system to aid in this process but it is
important to realize that the use of such a technology is
not itself representative of a centralized scheme — more
changes are needed. 112

There is, however, a fundamental difference
between these two tools. In one case, the author or other
rightsholders might argue (assuming copyright is a property right) that they are expropriated without compensation (though ostensibly in the public interest). Users
might argue that in such a case the copyright monopoly
is simply not extended into areas where it does not
belong; their claim is usually that they need to access
and use a work lawfully and that in certain cases,
obtaining a licence is either impossible or completely
impracticable. 106 When a compulsory licence is in place,
these ‘‘obstacles’’ are removed and the issue then boils
down to whether the authors and other rightsholders
should be financially compensated.
A serious obstacle to the establishment of a new
compulsory licence or exemption is that it must be
allowed under the Berne Convention for the Protection
of Literary and Artistic Works, 107 to which Canada is
party, and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), 108 administered by
the World Trade Organization (WTO) and subject to
the WTO’s binding dispute-settlement system. 109 There
are very few cases where such compulsory licensing or
exemption would be possible. There is no such limitation on, for example, using extended collective licensing,
provided rightsholders can opt out of the scheme and
continue to manage their rights individually. 110

In Europe, problems of fragmentation and the challenge of licensing multimedia products are being
addressed both at the different national and international governmental levels. 113 New rights clearance centres have been established in many countries on the
national level, but a central clearance centre for all of
Europe has yet to emerge. A common characteristic of
these clearance centres is that the multimedia producer
can clear all rights for a project by stopping and shopping at one single centre. Several countries have implemented ‘‘one-stop-shop’’ centres. 114
The European Commission also funded 10 pilot
projects on multimedia rights clearance systems:
INDECS, 115 EFRIS, 116 TV FILES, 117 PRISAM, 118 ORS, 119
BONA FIDE, 120 b (before copyright), 121 COMPAS 122
RCTRIDW 123 and VERDI. 124 The VERDI project
attracted much attention. The aim of the VERDI project
was to build an infrastructure to licence use of multimedia content for European users and rightsholders.

Centralized licensing agents

A ‘‘one-stop-shop’’ multimedia clearance centre has
also been started in Japan. For example, the Japan Copyright Information Service Center (J-CIS) contains a
database that provides users with information about
copyrights in multiple fields, but it does not yet go as far
as handling rights clearance. 125 Japan is also the home of
the Copymart project launched several years ago by Professor Zentaro Kitagawa. 126 Copymart is a highly flexible
system allowing rightsholders (or their representatives)
and users to ‘‘meet’’ electronically. Users can then obtain
a licence based on their needs. 127

Centralized licensing must be distinguished from
collective licensing. Collective licensing, as in the case of
Canada, typically involves the establishment of a collective society for the administration of a specific right such
as mechanical rights or reproduction rights, on behalf of
rightsholders. The collective aspect is formed through
the coming together of rightsholders within a particular
domain whereby the collective society negotiates and
administers the clearance and use of rights for a set fee. 111
Centralized licensing, on the other hand, is the aggregation of collective management societies into an umbrella
society for the sole purpose of providing a central point

Meanwhile, voluntary licensing of digital uses by
collective management societies is already in place in the
United States. ASCAP and BMI, the two U.S. performing
rights collectives, have tariffs relating to the public performance of music on the Internet. Copyright Clearance
Centre (CCC) licenses reproduction of printed material
for inclusion in ‘‘digital coursepacks’’, reuse of material
on Web sites, intranets, CD-ROMs and other digital
media. CCC also offers a repertory-based licence for
internal digital reuse of material by corporate users.
Interestingly, in the latter program, users can only scan
material not made available by the publisher himself in
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digital form. 128 CCC’s ability to license digital uses is
entirely based on voluntary and non-exclusive rights
transfers from rightsholders.
The ‘‘one-stop-shop’’ clearance centres greatly facilitate rights clearing with multimedia products and are
seen as a solution originating with the market. 129 Central
licensing has been heralded an efficient way of rights
clearance for both collective society members and
users. 130 Central licensing, however, is not a solution free
of criticism. These central licensing agents are administered on a national basis; coordination on a European
and an international basis remains largely unexplored. 131
The extent of collaboration and standardization, therefore, is somewhat restricted to the domestic market. Furthermore, there are concerns that users will begin to
‘‘shop’’ deals — advantageous for users but potentially
disadvantageous for creators. As one author notes:
A deeper tension lies between some of the European
collecting societies themselves all intent on being the one to
offer the one stop license and as this power struggle is
played out, the situation has arose that it now becomes
possible to shop around the various territories to get the best
rates and widest territorial licenses. All of this in front of the
backdrop of the failure to conclude a memorandum of
understanding between collecting societies and rights
owners for either international or European-wide on-line
licensing and question . . . of who licenses whom. 132

Finally, pre-clearance of rights on a transactional
basis at a one-stop-shop is a fairly complex, long and
expensive process even when done through an efficient
ECMS and even with the added benefit of having a
single point of departure in the rights maze. It may work
for professional users seeking to create a CD-ROM, but
in its current form and application, is much less viable
for mass market uses. 133
This also begs the question of whether the acquisition and management of (multimedia) rights should be
facilitated by legislative or contractual mechanisms. A
market solution may not be the most efficient or feasible
solution. On the other hand, an overriding central
licensing system may require legislative backing. 134
The workability of a central licensing agency or
one-stop-shop multimedia clearance centre in Canada
remains an attractive solution. It must be noted, however, that licensing of digital uses has in fact begun.
SOCAN filed a tariff for the public performance of
music (known as ‘‘Tariff 22’’) and the Copyright Board
rendered a ‘‘Phase I’’ decision on legal issues, 135 which
was modified by the Federal Court of Appeal, 136 a decision now before the Supreme Court. 137 SODRAC and
CMRRA have also filed tariffs concerning the reproduction of music in Internet transmissions and NRCC with
respect to the neighbouring rights involved in the transmission. 138 While these initiatives are important, they fall
shy of implementing a centralized licensing system that
would truly constitute a ‘‘one-stop-shop’’ environment
for users. An overarching system is required which
would incorporate all collective management societies
for rights identification and licensing terms.

It may be the case that in Canada, one or two
collective management societies are best suited to provide centralized licensing services, and that an entirely
new agent would not need to be created. 139 Again, the
more important question is whether such an arrangement will evolve ‘‘naturally’’ or whether a legislative
impetus will be necessary.

Standard form contracts and coalitions
Multilateral agreements between collective management societies represent another potential solution.
Referring to our matrix example, collective management
societies would set up agreements with one another to
set standards and establish cooperative compensatory
regimes, so that a user could approach any of these societies and obtain the information necessary to clear the
right to use a work. They would not have to go from
point to point in search of the relevant information. This
is best characterized as a standardization effort.
A useful example of such a system is the administration of mechanical rights in Europe. Centralized
licensing regimes on a European-wide (and to a certain
extent worldwide) basis are prevalent within the field of
mechanical rights. The Bureau International des Soci´
et´
es
G´
erant les Droits D’Enregistrement et de Reproduction
M´
ecanique (BIEM) and the International Federation of
the Phonographic Industry (IFPI) were formed as international organizations that group societies for the purpose
of effective and efficiently administrating mechanical
rights. 140
BIEM is a confederation or a ‘‘super society’’ of over
40 mechanical rights organizations from over 30 countries throughout the world. 141 BIEM is responsible for
negotiating the terms of a general licensing system for
the reproduction of musical works on sound recordings
with IFPI. The licensing arrangements are then administered by member organizations of BIEM in their respective territories. This arrangement is aligned with a centralized licensing arrangement. However, these
arrangements were not as harmonized as one might
expect. The licensing arrangements varied in terms of
national and international repertoire covered, duration,
and discounts on royalties to the record companies. 142
This led to dissatisfaction of many music producers and
record companies who began to challenge the authority
of many collective management societies, and to the
individual negotiation of contracts. 143
Furthermore, the success of BIEM is largely contingent on negotiations for the renewal of the BIEM/IFPI
Standard Contract which the two organizations negotiate every four to five years. This Standard Contract
forms the basis for reciprocal agreements between societies. 144 The last round of negotiations in 1997 at the
MIDEM Conference between BIEM and IFPI generated
disagreement in positions between the two groups. This,
in turn, resulted in a stalemate in the process; based on
economic and legal interests, the mechanical rights socie-
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ties sought to maximize the compensation to music creators and publishers while the phonographic societies
sought to reduce such costs.
After experiencing an impasse in negotiations for
the better part of a year, and after more than a year of
operating under the conditions of an expired contract,
an agreement regarding the terms to constitute a new
Standard Contract between BIEM and IFPI was signed.
The contract was to be executed with effect from July 1,
1997 through June 30, 2000. 145 This contract, known as
the ‘‘Cannes Agreement’’, involved two essential elements: the mechanical rights societies agreed not only to
reduce overall commission rates taken on phonomechanical royalty income but also to introduce an element of transparency to their procedure. 146
In the spirit of previously negotiated contracts
between BIEM and IFPO, new coalitions and efforts are
being made in the exploitation and administration of
multimedia rights. For example, some major players of
the music industry (BIEM, CISAC, IFPI, and RIAA) are
working together on a project to develop a global identification scheme for digital music content. 147 A similar
scheme has been developed to identify motion pictures. 148
While the promulgation of standard form contracts
is an appealing solution, it is premised on voluntary
association. It is a matter of conceptualization at one
level, and practical reality at the other. Should collective
management societies form such arrangements and take
the initiative to establish centralized licensing regimes,
then other solutions may not be required. The current
reality, however, is that this is not occurring in Canada,
therefore, perhaps legislative or governmental involvement is required.

According to one theory, what are important are
distribution rights. This is perhaps mostly amply illustrated in the following passage:

International centralized licensing system

Conclusion

The point may be made that any reformation to the
structure of collective management societies on a
national level is an incomplete solution. Some would
argue that an international collective society is
required. 149 One argument in favour of this solution is
that while rights may be owned on a national basis, they
do not necessarily need to be managed on a national
basis. In the digital era, the latter point is amplified. But
the creation of an international centralized licensing
system is, to a certain extent, somewhat beyond the
scope of this paper and perhaps beyond the scope of a
realistic solution. 150

C

Revamping copyright
The most radical solution and one requiring a rich
and complex analysis, but one which is mostly outside of
the scope of this paper, is to literally scrap ‘‘copy’’-right
law altogether. The argument is that in the advent of
digital technology, it may be that to speak of copyright in
terms of rights associated with ‘‘copying’’ a work is a
misnomer.

. . . the fundamental right granted by copyright is the right of
reproduction — of making copies. Indeed the very word
‘‘copyright’’ appears to signify that the right to control copying must be fundamental part of any system of copyright
. . . The advent of digital documents has illuminated this
issue: In the digital realm, copying is not a good predictor of
intent to infringe; moreover, copying of digital works is
necessary for normal use of those works. We argue that the
right to control copying should be eliminated as an
organizing principle of copyright law. In its place, we propose as an organizing principle the right to control public
distribution of the copyrighted work. 151

Other proposals, applicable only to the Internet, are
to create a ‘‘right of computer network transmission’’ 152
or to replace copyright with a broad levy on blank
media. 153 This could be helpful if such right combined
and/or replaced all existing fragments, not if added as an
additional one. 154
Others have focused on transforming copyright into
a ‘‘use’’ right, which could be limited to commercially
significant uses, especially unauthorized uses that lead to
loss of revenue for rightsholders. 155 A reform of the list of
fragments of the copyright bundle contained in section 3
of the Act would start from the premise that such rights
do not correspond to actual uses, which are often minibundles of many of the listed rights. 156
While the soil is perhaps not yet ripe to completely
revamp copyright law at this point, it is important to
recognize the growing discourse in this area.

ollective management societies may be justified
only so far as the level of quality of services is
acceptable and efficient, thereby taking into account the
administrative technologies available. Thus, in its inception, collective management societies developed out of
necessity; it was not feasible for authors and publishers
to maintain a direct relationship with users. In the
advent of new technologies, however, authors and publishers may be able to initiate and maintain a direct
relationship with users. While this does not necessarily
abolish altogether the role of collective management
societies, it highlights the need to reform the existing
collective society structure in order to justify their continued existence on one level, and to alleviate the
emerging problems of fragmentation. This is not to say
that the role of collective management societies is diminishing. It is that their role is changing. There is a similar
motif that runs through each of the outlined solutions:
that some form of centralization and standardization is
an absolute prerequisite to efficiency, particularly in the
context of the digital era.
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